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CONTRACTUAL EXPANSION OF THE
SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ARBITRATION AWARDS UNDER THE
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
CYNTHIA A. MURRAY'
INTRODUCTION

Recent circuit court decisions have created a split of
authority regarding the enforceability of arbitration provisions
by which parties seek to eliminate or relax the statutory
restrictions on the judicial overturning of arbitration awards. 1
As set forth in 9 U.S.C. § 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA
or the "Act"), the statutory grounds for judicial overturning of
awards are extremely limited. 2 As a rule, arbitration awards
may not be vacated for errors of law or fact. 3 In Lapine
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1 See Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 934 (10th Cir. 2001) (rejecting
the argument that the parties are free to contractually expand the scope of review of
an arbitration award); Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 888 (9th
Cir. 1997) (holding that arbitration agreements should be enforced according to
their terms, which includes allowing a broader scope of judicial review); Gateway
Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1995) (allowing
expanded review of arbitration awards); Chi. Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chi.
Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1504-05 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating in dicta that
parties should not be permitted to expand the scope of review of arbitration
awards).
2 See
Leanne Montgomery, Expanded Judicial Review of Commercial
Arbitration Awards-Bargainingfor the Best of Both Worlds: Lapine Technology
Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997), 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 529, 529
(2000) (suggesting that many consider arbitration awards to be "unreviewable").
3 See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 932 ("A court may not... independently judge an
arbitration award."); Lapine Tech. Corp., 130 F.3d at 888 ("[A] federal court may
vacate or modify an arbitration award only if that award is 'completely irrational,'
exhibits a 'manifest disregard of law,' or otherwise falls within one of the grounds
set forth in 9 U.S.C. §§ 10 or 11.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also
Hans Smit, ContractualModification of the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitral
Awards, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 147, 148 (1997).
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Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp.4 and Gateway Technologies,
Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.,5 however, two circuit
courts held that parties may contract for expanded judicial
review of arbitration awards. In contrast, in Bowen v. Amoco
Pipeline Co., 6 the Tenth Circuit held that the scope of judicial
review under the FAA cannot be contractually expanded. There
is also dicta from the Seventh Circuit suggesting that parties
may not contract for expanded judicial review of an arbitration
7
award.
The question of whether parties may expand the scope of
judicial review of arbitration awards-typically to provide
vacation of an award for what would be reversible of errors of
law or fact in a court system-is based on "contract,
jurisdictional, and public policy arguments."
Supporters of
expanded review, similar to the type accorded trial court
determinations, emphasize that the purpose of the Act is to
make arbitral provisions as enforceable as other contracts. 9
Opponents of such expansion claim that fuller judicial review
would hinder critical aspects of the arbitral process, including its
finality and relative speed. 10 Opponents also point to perceived
constitutional limits on the scope of federal court jurisdiction,
claiming that alteration of such jurisdiction by contract is an
impermissible usurpation of congressional authority.'
This Note asserts that allowing parties to agree to expand
judicial review efficiently promotes the congressional intent
underlying the FAA, which is to require that the parties be free
to place contractual restrictions on arbitral power. Part I
provides background information about the FAA.
Part II
4 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997).
5 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995).
6 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001).
7 See Chi. Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chi. Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501,
1504-05 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Federal courts do not review the soundness of arbitration
awards.").
8 Montgomery, supra note 2, at 550.
9 See infra Part III.A.
10 See Smit, supra note 3, at 151 (asserting that limited judicial review is
necessary to ensure that arbitration remains a "single-instance form of
adjudication"); Karon Sasser, Comment, Freedom to Contractfor Expanded Judicial
Review in Arbitration Agreements, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 337, 365 (2001) (suggesting
that expanded judicial review of arbitration awards will result in a lengthier, more
expensive, and more complicated process, thereby undermining the purpose of
arbitration).
11 See infra Part III.B.
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discusses the enforceability of agreements concerning how the
arbitration is to be conducted, and then examines the cases
dealing with attempts to broaden judicial review by contract.
Part III analyzes the contract, constitutional, and other policy
arguments concerning expansion of review and demonstrates
that the arguments favoring a permissive judicial attitude in
this area are persuasive. Part III also shows that federal courts
have already overridden perceived statutory restrictions on the
scope of judicial review, particularly for statutory claims.
Finally, this Note concludes that the underlying purposes of the
FAA support contractual expansion of the scope of judicial
review of arbitration awards.
I.

BACKGROUND OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT

Until the early twentieth century, the American legal
system, having adopted the English common law view, harbored
Congress
an "inhospitable attitude toward arbitration."1 2
this
antichange
to
an
effort
enacted the FAA in 1925 in
13
In adopting the Act, Congress was
arbitration policy.
" 'motivated, first and foremost, by a ...desire' to change this
antiarbitration rule. It intended courts to 'enforce [arbitration]
agreements into which parties had entered,' and to 'place such
agreements "upon the same footing as other contracts." ' "14 The
statute states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such a
12 Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in
American Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1949 (1996). Prior to the early twentieth
century, the traditional view was that if courts were to function as the national
source of justice, there was no room for "makeshift, party-confected modes of dispute
resolution." Id. at 1947. The sense was that arbitration was untrustworthy and
unacceptable. See id. at 1948.
13 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995)
("[Tihe basic purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act is to overcome courts' refusals
to enforce agreements to arbitrate."); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (noting that the purpose of the FAA "was to reverse the
longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English
common law and had been adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration
agreements upon the same footing as other contracts").
14 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc., 513 U.S. at 270-71 (alteration in original)
(citations omitted); see also Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220
(1985).
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contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable,

and

enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
15
for the revocation of any contract.
Although the FAA does not create independent federal
jurisdiction, 16 it does create a body of substantive federal law. 17
The FAA is constitutional, as it was enacted pursuant to
Congress's Commerce Clause and admiralty powers. 18 The FAA
has also been found to have significant preemptive force over
both state courts and state arbitral systems that restrict the
enforceability of arbitration clauses. 19
The Supreme Court has acknowledged Congress's intention
to treat arbitration agreements the same as other contracts 20
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000) (providing that independent federal jurisdiction is
required when a party to an arbitration agreement seeks to have a federal court
enforce its provisions); see also In re Fils et Cables D'Acier de Lens v. Midland
Metals Corp., 584 F. Supp. 240, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("Before one can seek to
confirm an arbitration award in federal court, federal subject matter jurisdiction
must exist independently of [the FAA].").
17 See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983).
Section 2 [of the FAA] is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state
substantive or procedural policies to the contrary. The effect of the section
is to create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to
any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.... [Tihe Courts
of Appeals have.., consistently concluded that questions of arbitrability
must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring
arbitration. We agree. The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of
federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver,
delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.
Id.
18 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc., 513 U.S. at 273-77 (interpreting
"involving commerce" to be the functional equivalent of "affecting commerce," within
Congress's broad power under the Commerce Clause); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967).
19 The FAA has been held to preempt state law restrictions on the arbitrability
of certain types of claims. See Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473
U.S. 614, 627 (1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1984); Moses
H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24.
20 See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 478 (1989) ("[Tlhe FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when they
have not agreed to do so, . . . [ilt simply requires courts to enforce privately
negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with their
terms."); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) (stating that
the FAA's "purpose was to place an arbitration agreement 'upon the same footing as
other contracts, where it belongs"' (quoting H.R. REP. No. 68-96 (1924))).
15

16
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and has instructed courts to enforce arbitration agreements
according to their terms. 21 The Court has also emphasized the
importance of finality of an arbitrator's decision and,
accordingly, district courts should vacate an arbitrator's award
only in narrow circumstances. 22 Additionally, the Court has
established a liberal federal policy favoring the use of arbitration
23
to resolve an increasingly broad array of disputes.
Congress has established narrow grounds for vacating
24
arbitration awards under section 10 of the FAA:
1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means;
2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them;
3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing
to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of
any party have been prejudiced; and
4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite
25
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
As previously noted, section 10 of the FAA is not generally
read to permit overturning of arbitral awards for errors of fact or
law. 26 In general, if the arbitral award in question does not fall
into one of the four categories above, the court will simply
confirm the award made by the arbitrator. 27 Indeed, most
21 See Volt, 489 U.S. at 476 ("[Tlhe federal policy is simply to ensure the
enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate.").

22 See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) ("[A] party
who has not agreed to arbitrate will normally have a right to a court's decision
about the merits of its dispute ... [blut, where the party has agreed to arbitrate, he
or she, in effect, has relinquished much of that right's practical value.").
23 See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 470 U.S. at 221 ("The preeminent concern of
Congress in passing the [FAA] was to enforce private agreements into which parties
had entered, and that concern requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to
arbitrate ..
"); Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10 (explaining that in enacting the
FAA Congress not only "declared a national policy favoring arbitration" but also
"withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of
claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration"); Moses H.
Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24.
24 See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
25 Id.
26 See supra text accompanying note 3.
27 See Alan Scott Rau, ContractingOut of the Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT'L
ARB. 225, 230-31 (1997) (stating that the provisions of the FAA "direct courts to
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awards in domestic commercial arbitration do not specify the
factual and/or legal grounds on which they are based, thus
making judicial review impractical and, at times, impossible. 28
Accordingly, there are numerous examples where courts have
upheld arbitral awards that appear contrary to law and fact. 29
As arbitration grows in popularity as an alternative form of
dispute resolution, 30 the grounds for review of an arbitral award
found in section 10 of the FAA have become the subject of
increased debate.
II.

MODIFICATIONS OF THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

A.

GeneralEnforceability of Party Specifications in Arbitration
Clauses
Arbitration is "a matter of consent, not coercion, and parties
are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as
they see fit."31 In order to feel more secure in the arbitration
process, parties have attempted to modify the scope of judicial
review in a number of ways.
The Supreme Court has
acknowledged that contractual specifications regarding the
confirm awards unless certain specified grounds for vacatur are present").
28 See Stephen A. Hochman, Judicial Review to Correct Arbitral Error-An
Option to Consider, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 103, 105 (1997) (explaining that
there can be no meaningful review of an arbitral award without a written
explanation for the award).
29 See, e.g., Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1990) (upholding
an arbitral award even though the arbitrators committed legal error); Federated
Dep't Stores, Inc. v. J.V.B. Indus., Inc., 894 F.2d 862, 866 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding
that errors of law do not require vacatur); In re Koch Oil, S.A. v. Transocean Gulf
Oil Co., 751 F.2d 551, 554 (2d Cir. 1985) (confirming an arbitrator's award for
damages even though damages had been calculated using "higher prices than those
the parties agreed to in the contracts, by awarding lost profits or consequential
damages despite the contracts' express disallowance of their recovery"); Marion Mfg.
Co. v. W.B. Long, 588 F.2d 538, 542 (6th Cir. 1978) (confirming an award ordering a
seller of cotton to deliver bales of cotton to the buyer under a contract even though
specific performance is an unusual remedy in a contract for sale of a product); CalCircuit Abco, Inc. v. Solbourne Computer, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 1506, 1510 (D.C. Colo.
1994) (confirming an arbitral award where seller submitted a claim for lost profits
under the U.C.C. but where the arbitrator invented a claim for price of unpaid
orders under another section of the U.C.C.).
30 See Michael P. O'Mullan, Note, Seeking Consistency in Judicial Review of
Securities Arbitration:An Analysis of the Manifest Disregardof the Law Standard,
64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1121, 1121 (1995) (noting that arbitration has increasingly
become a forum for those seeking to avoid the court system).
31 See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
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arbitration process are enforceable absent a severe clash with
perceived public policy favoring arbitration. 32 Although the FAA
contains no preemptive provision, state law may be preempted
by the FAA "to the extent that it 'stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress.' "33 Notwithstanding federal preemption, parties
can agree to have state law arbitral rules govern their
arbitration as long as the state law does not clash with the
policies underlying the FAA. 34 For example, parties can alter the
arbitral rules to broaden pretrial discovery or to require the
arbitrator to provide his reasoning for the award. 35 Parties can
also provide for broad review of awards by arbitral appellate
tribunals. 36 In reviewing arbitration clauses, the Supreme Court
has recognized the importance of freedom of contract, and most
courts have demonstrated a willingness to enforce these clauses
37
according to the agreed upon specifications.
B.

Expanded JudicialReview

The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of expanding judicial
review in Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications
Corp.38 The facts involve MCI's successful bid for a project with
the Virginia Department of Corrections in which MCI would
implement a telephone system that would allow inmates to place
collect calls without operator assistance. 39
MCI then
subcontracted with Gateway who promised to furnish, install,
and maintain all the equipment and technology necessary to
support the collect calls. 40 The contract provided that all
disputes arising from the contract would be subject to binding
32 See id. at 479 (concluding that parties may alter the procedural rules of the
arbitration process as long as those rules do not conflict with the underlying policies
of the FAA). The FAA, however, preempts state rules that undermine the principles
of the FAA. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
33 Volt, 489 U.S. at 477 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
34 See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 58
(1995); Volt, 489 U.S. at 479.
35 See STEPHEN J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 2.3, at 21
(2001); Tom Cullinan, Note, Contractingfor an Expanding Scope of JudicialReview
in ArbitrationAgreements, 51 VAND. L. REV. 395, 397 (1998).
36 See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
37 See infra Part IL.A.
38 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995).
39 Id. at 995.
40 Id.
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arbitration, "except that errors of law shall be subject to
appeal." 41 A dispute arose and the arbitrator found that MCI
had breached its contractual duty to negotiate in good faith and
42 MCI
awarded Gateway actual as well as punitive damages.
moved to vacate the award in the Northern District of Texas,
and Gateway simultaneously moved to confirm the award. 43 The
district court chose to review the award under a "harmless error
44
standard" and confirmed the award for Gateway in its entirety.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court had erred
in applying a harmless error standard instead of reviewing the
award de novo for "errors of law." 45 The court stated that
"[p]rudent or not, the contract expressly and unambiguously
provides for review of 'errors of law'; to interpret this phrase
short of de novo review would render the language meaningless
and would frustrate the mutual intent of the parties." 46 The
court held that the contractual modification of the scope of
judicial review was enforceable because "arbitration is a creature
of contract."47 Additionally, the court viewed the FAA as a
default set of rules which the parties may supplement with their
own provisions. 48 Since one of the FAA's purposes is to enforce
contractual agreements according to their terms, the court found
that MCI and Gateway's contractual modification of the default
standard of review was enforceable.49 The court did not address
any Article III jurisdictional concerns.

Id.
42 Id. at 996.
43 Id.
41

44 Id.

45 Id. at 997.
46 Id. (adding that federal arbitration policy requires that a court conduct

review of an arbitration award according to the terms of the agreement, even where
the parties agree to expanded judicial review).
47 Id. at 996 (noting that it would not make sense if the FAA prevented "the
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate under different rules that those set forth in
the Act itself. Indeed, such a result would be quite inimical to the FAA's purpose of
ensuring that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms"
(quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 479 (1989))).
48 Id. at 997.
49 Id. at 996. The court noted that had the parties not contracted for expanded
judicial review, the standards of review set forth in the FAA would have governed.
Id. at 997 n.3.
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The same issue was addressed a few years later by the
Ninth Circuit in Lapine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp.50 The
dispute arose after Lapine issued a manufacturing license to
Kyocera to build disk drives. 51 When Kyocera refused to perform
52
under the contract, Lapine filed suit in federal district court.
The parties' contract contained an arbitration clause which
provided, inter alia, that an arbitrator's decision may be vacated
by a court "(a) based upon any grounds referred to in the Act, or
(b) where the Tribunal's findings of fact are not supported by
substantial evidence, or (c) where the Tribunal's conclusions of
53
law are erroneous."
The Tribunal issued its decision in favor of Lapine, and
Kyocera moved to vacate the arbitrator's award. 54 The district
court denied Kyocera's motion to vacate and held that it would
not review the award for errors of law but rather would only
consider the statutory grounds for vacatur under the FAA55
Kyocera's appeal to the Ninth Circuit essentially focused on one
major issue: "Is federal court review of an arbitration agreement
necessarily limited to the grounds set forth in the FAA or can the
56
court apply greater scrutiny, if the parties have so agreed?"
Reversing the district's court decision, the Ninth Circuit
relied on the premise that the primary purpose of the FAA is to
enforce private agreements to arbitrate in accordance with their
terms. 57 The Ninth Circuit fully agreed with the Fifth Circuit's
view in Gateway that the scope of judicial review may be
expanded beyond the limitations of the FAA if the parties have
provided for such review in the contract.5 8 The court reasoned
that a federal court is not necessarily limited to the grounds set
forth in the FAA in reviewing an arbitration agreement; rather
the court can apply greater scrutiny when the parties so agree.5 9
50 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997).
51 Id. at 886.
52 Id.

53 Id. at 887.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 888.

58 See id. at 889 ("Federal courts can expand their review of an arbitration

award beyond the FAA's grounds, when (but only to the extent that) the parties
have so agreed. To do otherwise would make hostility to arbitration agreements
erumpent under the guise of deference to the arbitration concept.").
59 Id. at 888-89 (perceiving no adequate reason to prohibit parties from
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Moreover, the FAA not only allows parties to place conditions on
a federal court's review of an arbitrator's decision to review for
errors of fact and law but also encourages such conditions. 60
Most recently, the Tenth Circuit directly addressed the issue
of expanded judicial review of arbitral awards in Bowen v. Amoco
Pipeline Co. 61 After noticing an oily sheen in a creek on his
property, the owner sought remediation from the oil company
that owned the pipelines crossing the creek. 62 Following Amoco's
continued denial of responsibility for 'the oil leak, the owners
filed suit in district court. 63 The district court granted Amoco's
request to stay the litigation and to compel arbitration under an
arbitration clause in the parties' 1918 right-of-way agreement. 64
The parties agreed to use the Rules for Non-Administered
Arbitration of Business Disputes and modified the rules to
expand the scope of judicial review. 65 The agreement provided
that either party would have the right to appeal "any arbitration
award to the district court within thirty days 'on the grounds
that the award is not supported by the evidence' " and "the
district court's ruling 'shall be final.' "66
The arbitrator awarded the owners of the land compensatory
and punitive damages exceeding five million dollars. 67 The
Bowens filed a motion in district court to confirm the award
while Amoco filed a motion to vacate the award. 68 In its review
of the award, the district court did not apply the expanded
review to the arbitration agreement. 69 Instead, the court limited
its review to the standards under the FAA and declined to vacate
the award. 70 Amoco appealed the district court's decision,
arguing that the court erred by disregarding the parties' agreed
7l
upon contractually created standard.

including an enforceable review provision in the arbitration agreement).
60 See id. at 890.
61 254 F.3d 925 (10th
62 Id. at 927.

70

Id. at 928.
Id.
Id. at 930.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

71

Id.

63
64
65
66
67
68
69

Cir. 2001).
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Contrary to the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that parties may not expand the standards of review
set forth under the FAA. v2 While the court agreed that parties
may contract as to what issues to arbitrate and what rules will
govern arbitration,7 3 "no authority clearly allows private parties
to determine how federal courts review arbitration awards."7 4
Rather, Congress has provided explicit provisions regarding
standards of review of arbitration awards through the FAA. 75
Allowing parties to contractually expand judicial review of
arbitration awards would undermine the policies of the FAA. 76
Relying on dicta from the Seventh and Eighth Circuits,77 the
court stated:
We would reach an illogical result if we concluded that the
FAA's policy of ensuring judicial enforcement of arbitration
agreements is well served by allowing for expansive judicial
review after the matter is arbitrated. The FAA's limited review
ensures judicial respect for the arbitration process and prevents
courts from enforcing parties' agreements to arbitrate only to
refuse to respect the results of the arbitration. These limited
standards manifest a legislative intent to further the federal
policy favoring arbitration by preserving the independence of
78
the arbitration process.

73

Id. at 935.
Id. at 934.

74

Id.

72

75 Id. ("The decisions directing courts to honor parties' agreements and to

resolve close questions in favor of arbitration simply do not dictate that courts
submit to varying standards of review imposed by private contract.").
76 See id. at 935 (allowing for expansive judicial review after the matter has
been arbitrated would violate the FAA's policy of ensuring judicial enforcement of
arbitration agreements). Additionally, "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate, a party 'trades the
procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity,
informality, and expedition of arbitration.'" Id. (quoting Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991)); see also Kenneth M. Curtin,
An Examination of Contractual Expansion and Limitation of Judicial Review of
Arbitral Awards, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 337, 367 (2000) (reasoning that
although allowing parties to contractually expand review would promote freedom of
contract, it would also undermine the certainty and predictability in enforcing
arbitral awards).
77 The court relied upon UHC Management Co., Inc. v. Computer Sciences
Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 1998) and Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v.
Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1504-05 (7th Cir. 1991).
78 Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935. The court added:
Contractually expanded standards, particularly those that allow for factual
review, clearly threaten to undermine the independence of the arbitration
process and dilute the finality of arbitration awards because, in order for
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While acknowledging that the Supreme Court has
emphasized "that Congress's intent in enacting the FAA was to
79
ensure judicial enforcement of private arbitration agreements,"
the Tenth Circuit nonetheless disagreed with the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits' conclusions that contractual modifications of
judicial review are enforceable.80 The Tenth Circuit thus
concluded that "[allthough the [Supreme] Court has emphasized
that parties may 'specify by contract the rules under which [ I
arbitration will be conducted,' it has never said parties are free
to interfere with the judicial process."81 Furthermore, the court
stated that the FAA does not contain any language that would
82
require federal courts to follow parties' agreements.
In reaching its decision, the court found that the parties'
attempt to expand the scope of judicial review was in direct
conflict with the policies of the FAA.8 3

Rejecting the parties'

demand for expanded review, the court emphasized that
Congress has provided explicit boundaries for the standards of
review of arbitration awards and as such, those standards are
not subject to modification.8 4 The underlying rationale for the
Tenth Circuit's decision appears to be that allowing parties to
contract for judicial review of an arbitral award would, in effect,
grant parties the power to create federal jurisdiction.8 5 This
would permit parties to override Congress's power to convey
jurisdiction to the federal courts under Article III of the United
States Constitution.8 6 The Tenth Circuit also relied on the idea
that expanded judicial review would impermissibly force courts
arbitration awards to be effective, courts must not only enforce the

agreements to arbitrate but also enforce the resulting arbitration awards.
Id.
Id. at 933.
Id. at 934.
81 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)). See Smit, supra note 3, at
150 (concluding that even though parties are permitted to structure their
arbitration by agreement, this does not imply that the parties are also permitted to
alter the judicial process).
82 See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935.
83 See id.
84 See id.
85 See id. n.8; see also Chi. Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chi. Sun-Times, Inc.
935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991).
86 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.").
79
80
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to apply varying standards of review and unfamiliar rules and
87
procedures.
C.

Limited JudicialReview and Appellate Arbitration

There is very little case law illustrating parties' attempts to
eliminate judicial review of an arbitral award. None of the cases
discussed deals with appellate arbitration, where an arbitration
panel will review the hearing panel's or single arbitrator's
decision.8 8
Such panels, as creatures of contract, may be
empowered to use as broad a standard of review as provided for
and can "provide a check on the otherwise unreviewable nature
of the... arbitration award."8 9 Such clauses are not at all
uncommon, particularly in large commercial contracts. 90
87

See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 936 (recognizing that " 'where arbitration is

contemplated the courts are not equipped to provide the same judicial review given
to structured judgments defined by procedural rules and legal principles' " (quoting
UHC Mgmt. Co. v. Computer Scis. Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 998 (8th Cir. 1998))).
88 See Chi. Typographical Union No. 16, 935 F.2d at 1505 ("If the parties want,
they can contract for an appellate arbitration panel to review the arbitrator's
award.").
89 Stephen Hayford & Ralph Peeples, CommercialArbitration in Evolution: An
Assessment and Call for Dialogue, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 343, 405 (1995).
90 For an example of contractual provisions for the review of an arbitral award
by an appellate arbitration panel, see Hochman, supranote 28, at 124-25:
Right to Review by Appellate Arbitration Panel
(a) If either party is dissatisfied with (i) the decision or award rendered by
a sole arbitrator or (ii) a less than unanimous decision or award rendered
by a panel of three arbitrators, such dissatisfied party ("Appellant") may
appeal the arbitrator's award to a panel of three appellate arbitrators by
filing with the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the other party
("Appellee"), within twenty days after transmittal of the award, a written
brief, not to exceed twenty pages, stating the reasons why the arbitrator's
decision should be reversed or modified. The Appellee shall file with the
AAA and serve on the Appellant, within twenty days after receiving the
Appellant's brief, an opposition brief, not to exceed twenty pages, which
may include a cross-appeal, in which case Appellant shall be entitled to
reply within ten days after its receipt thereof.
(b) The appellate arbitration panel shall consist of two lawyers having the
qualifications and experience set forth in [Section _j hereof and one
retired federal or state court judge of a court of record in the state in which
the arbitration was held. The two lawyers shall be appointed in the same
manner as provided in [Section __j hereof. If the parties cannot agree on a
mutually acceptable retired judge to serve as the third appellate
arbitrator, the President of [the __ Bar Association] shall submit to both
parties a list containing the names of three retired judges who, in his or
her opinion, also meet the criteria set forth in [Section __J hereof. Each
party shall be entitled to strike one of such three names on a peremptory
basis, for any reason or no reason, indicating its order of preference with
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III. POLICY ANALYSIS
The policy dimensions of this debate appear to set the
"arbitration as a matter of contract" advocates against those who
see attempted expansion of judicial review of arbitral awards as
an usurpation of Congress's power to determine the scope of
lower federal court subject matter jurisdiction under Article III
of the Constitution.
A.

The ContractApproach
Arbitration is founded upon freedom of contract. 91

The

respect to the remaining names, and the selection of the third appellate
arbitrator shall be made from among such name(s) that have not been so
stricken by either party in accordance with their designated order of
mutual preference.
(c) Either party may request oral argument before the appellate panel,
which, if requested, should be conducted within thirty days following the
selection of the appellate panel. The appellate arbitration shall be based
only on the record of the initial hearing, appellate briefs and oral
argument, if any. The appellate arbitrators shall render a written decision,
signed by a majority of such arbitrators, affirming, reversing, modifying or
remanding the arbitrator's decision and award within thirty days after
receiving the final appellate submissions. The appellate arbitrators may
reverse or modify the arbitrator's decision and award or remand the
matter for further proceedings by the arbitrator, on any of the following
grounds:
(i)Any ground specified in Sections 10 and 11 of the Federal
Arbitration Act;
(ii) The arbitrator committed prejudicial error by erroneously applying
the law to the issues and facts presented for resolution of the dispute
or there was a miscalculation of figures or a mistake in the description
of any person, thing or property referred to in the award;
(iii) Material failure of the arbitrator, the administrator or the
Appellee to follow the procedures set forth in this Agreement unless
the Appellant continued the arbitration proceeding with notice of such
failure and without objection;
(iv) The arbitrator's award is arbitrary, capricious or clearly
erroneous; or
(v)The appellate panel may render a final decision on appeal or
remand the matter for further proceedings by the arbitrator. The
decision of the appellate panel shall be final and binding on the
parties and shall not be subject to judicial review except to the extent
otherwise provided in Sections 10 or 11 of the FAA.
91See WARE, supra note 35, § 2.43, at 90 ("Judicial enforcement of arbitration
awards is an example of courts enforcing contracts."); see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v.
Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989) (recognizing
that arbitration "is a matter of consent, not coercion, and parties are generally free
to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit").
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parties alone determine what is to be arbitrated. 92 The parties,
subject only to unconscionability and other limited restrictions,
can set the types of damages the arbitrator may award. 93 The
94
parties also determine if there is to be appellate arbitration.
Most importantly, the parties, by incorporation or specification,
set the rules governing the arbitration process itself.95 Although
the American Arbitration Association (AAA) discourages
arbitrators from explaining the reasons for their awards, 96
parties may require an arbitrator to provide a written
97
explanation for his decision.
Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the
Leland Stanford Junior University98 illustrates the "contract
theory" of arbitration. Volt had entered into a contract with
92 See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995)
(acknowledging the principle that "a party can be forced to arbitrate only those

issues it specifically has agreed to submit to arbitration"); Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (acknowledging that
parties may exclude certain claims from the scope of an arbitration agreement);
Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 1997) (declaring
that parties may limit the issues which will be subject to arbitration).
93 See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 58 (1995)
(determining that if the parties' arbitration agreement permits punitive damages,
the agreement will be enforced according to its terms even if state law would
otherwise preclude such claims from arbitration).
94 See Chi. Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chi. Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501,
1505 (7th Cir. 1991) ("If the parties want, they can contract for an appellate
arbitration panel to review the arbitrator's award.").
95 See Volt, 489 U.S. at 478-79 (holding that parties may specify by contract to
arbitrate under rules different from those established by the FAA absent any direct
conflict with FAA policies); see also AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
COMMERCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES, R-1 (effective July 1, 2002)
available at http://www.adr.org/index ("The parties, by written agreement, may vary
the procedures set forth in these rules.").
96 See Hochman, supra note 28, at 104 (quoting the AAA's Guide for
Commercial Arbitrators as stating that "written opinions might open avenues for
attack on the award by the losing party").
97 No provision in the FAA requires arbitrators to include a written opinion.
When arbitrators fail to provide written explanations for an arbitration award,
parties are left to speculate as to the grounds on which the award was made and
providing a written opinion may help to raise confidences in the proceedings. See
Hochman, supra note 28, at 105 (explaining that the "more understandable the
award, the more likely it is to be respected, even by the losing party"). In this
regard, the standards set forth under the FAA can be seen as a set of "default rules"
that can be varied by express intent of the parties. See Rau, supra note 27, at 231
(characterizing default rules as a "ready-made stock of implied terms" that can
naturally be altered by parties who wish to expand the statutory grounds of review
or even restrict the grounds of review).
98 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
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Stanford University in which Volt was to install an electrical
system on the school's campus. 99 The contract contained an
agreement to arbitrate all disputes arising out of the contract,
along with a choice of law clause providing that California law
governed the contract. 10 0 During the project, a dispute arose and
Stanford filed an action against Volt in California Superior
Court. 10 1 Volt responded by petitioning the court to compel
arbitration of the dispute. 10 2 The California Superior Court
denied Volt's request to compel arbitration, relying on a
California statute that permitted "a court to stay arbitration
pending resolution of related litigation between a party to the
arbitration agreement and third parties not bound by it, where
'there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of
law or fact.' "103 The California Court of Appeals affirmed,
holding that by specifying that the contract would be governed
by the laws of California, "the parties had incorporated the
California

rules

of

arbitration ... into

their

arbitration

agreement." 10 4 The California Supreme Court denied Volt's
request for discretionary review. 105
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the California
courts' refusal to compel arbitration. 10 6
By incorporating
California law into the contract, the Court found that the parties
had adopted the California statutory scheme permitting a stay of
arbitration of related claims. 10 7 The Court held that the FAA
does not confer an automatic right to compel arbitration of all
claims; 0 8 rather, it simply requires courts to enforce privately
negotiated agreements to arbitrate in the manner provided in
the agreement. 109 In holding that the California statute in
question did not undermine the goals and policies of the FAA, 1 0

99 Id. at 470.
100

Id.

101 Id. at 470-71.
102

Id. at 471.

103

Id. (citations omitted).

104

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

105
106
107

472.
472-73.
473.
475.

108 Id. at 472.
109 Id. at 476 ("There is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain
set of procedural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability,
according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate.").
110 Id. (noting that the California arbitration statute was "manifestly designed
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the Court concluded that the FAA does not "prevent[] the
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate under different rules
than those set forth in the Act itself.... Just as they may limit
by contract the issues which they will arbitrate so too may they
specify by contract the rules under which that arbitration will be
In other words, because the federal policy
conducted."'1 1
favoring arbitration does not dictate arbitration under a
particular set of rules, parties may contract to a set of rules as
long as those rules are not in direct and serious conflict with the
federal policy goals of the FAA. 112 This ensures that the parties
13
have some latitude in customizing their arbitration process.
B. Perceived ConstitutionalLimitations
The constitutional argument against permitting parties to
expand the scope of judicial review is that because federal courts
are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction, 1 4 parties may
It is a well-settled
not create jurisdiction by contract. 1 5
principal that federal jurisdiction cannot be waived nor can it be
conferred by consent of the parties. 116 Under Article III of the
Constitution, Congress alone has the authority to convey
jurisdiction to the federal courts, 117 and courts must raise the
threshold issue of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. 11 But
does party expansion of judicial review invoke and confront the
constitutional dynamic just described? The answer should be no.
In a contractual dispute, the arbitrator derives his powers

to encourage resort to the arbitral process").
111Id. at 479 (citation omitted).
112 See id. at 478-79.
113 See id. at 472 (finding that parties should not be forced to arbitrate in a
manner contrary to their agreement).
114 See generally JOHN H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1999).
115 See Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline, Inc. 254 F.3d 925, 933 (10th Cir. 2001);
Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F. 3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Mayer, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the majority cited no explicit authority that would allow
parties to instruct an Article III court to review an arbitration decision).
116See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 114, § 2.2, at 12 (noting that jurisdiction is
determined by the situation as it exists when the suit is filed).
17 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.").
118 See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 114, § 2.2, at 12 (noting that courts are
under a duty to raise subject matter defects).
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from the arbitration clause. 119 Parties may, in effect, expand the
standard of review of an arbitration award by specifying how
much discretion the arbitrator is to have in deciding disputes.
Parties could direct an arbitrator to rule according to the specific
law of a jurisdiction and to decide facts consistently with the
weight of the evidence. 120 If the arbitrator does not comply with
the rules laid out in the arbitration agreement, then the parties
would seek to have the award vacated by claiming that the
12 1
arbitrator has exceeded his power under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).
By this method, the parties effectively broaden the scope of
judicial review of an arbitral award while remaining within the
express confines of section 10 of the FAA. By limiting the
arbitrator's discretion, the effect will be to modify the scope of
review without raising any constitutional issues.
The viability of this approach is recognized in certain New
York cases. Similar to section 10(a) of the FAA, New York's
CPLR 7511(b)(1)(iii) states that an arbitration award shall be
vacated when "an arbitrator, or agency or person making the
award exceeded his power or so imperfectly executed it that a
final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was
not made."1 22 The New York Court of Appeals has stated that by
"provision in the arbitration agreement," the parties can deprive
an arbitrator of his normal power to depart from the law and or
the evidence. 123 Accordingly, an arbitrator would be bound to
abide by principles of substantive law or rules of procedure when
124
the parties so provide in the arbitration clause.
119 See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-04
(1967) (explaining that under the "separability" doctrine, a federal court should

compel arbitration "once it is satisfied that 'the making of the agreement for
arbitration or the failure to comply with the arbitration agreement is not in issue' ")
(alteration in original); see also WARE, supra note 35, § 2.30, at 68.
120 See generally WARE, supra note 35, § 2.30, at 68 (explaining that because
the arbitration process is a creature of contract, the parties may determine the
issue(s) to be arbitrated and the rules by which the arbitrator must comply).
121 See id. § 2.44(d), at 92 (noting that courts may vacate arbitration awards
where the arbitrator has "exceeded [his or her] power").
122 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7511(b)(1)(iii) (Consol. 2000).
123 In re Sprinzen v. Nomberg, 389 N.E.2d 456, 458 (N.Y. 1979).
124 See id.; see also Rochester City Sch. Dist. v. Rochester Teachers Ass'n, 362
N.E.2d 977, 981 (N.Y. 1977) (affirming the arbitrator's award because the
"arbitrator had been granted broad power to resolve any 'claim * * * [olf
misinterpretation or inequitable application of * * * the terms of this agreement' ")
(alteration in original); Granite Worsted Mills, Inc. v. Aaronson Cowen, Ltd., 255
N.E.2d 168, 171 (N.Y. 1969) (Brietel, J., dissenting) (stating that the parties can
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"Non-Statutory"Grounds of Review

There are additional arguments that refute the Tenth
Circuit's conclusion precluding parties from expanding judicial
review. While parties have attempted to provide for expanded
review by contract, the courts themselves, in some contexts,
review certain types of awards on an "error of law" basis.
Federal courts have routinely interpreted the FAA to include, by
implication, grounds for judicial overturning not expressly set
forth in section 10.125 These grounds are not said to face
constitutional impediments because they are supported by the
126
congressional objectives in enacting the FAA.
Even though arbitral awards are not normally set aside for
errors in law or fact by the arbitrators, 127 it is broadly accepted
that arbitral awards may be vacated for "manifest disregard of
the law." 128
The Supreme Court recognized the "manifest
disregard" test in dictum in Wilko v. Swan. 129 Virtually all of the
circuit courts have articulated a rule that allows for a limited
right of review on the merits of an arbitration award for a
manifest disregard of the law. 130 Under a restrictive application,
there is only "manifest disregard" when the arbitrator has
acknowledged the existence of clearly applicable law and

limit the scope of the arbitrator's powers in the arbitration clause).
125 See generally WARE, supra note 35, § 2.45.
126 See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) (stating
that the FAA's "purpose was to place arbitration agreements 'upon the same footing
as other contracts, where it belongs'" (quoting H.R. REP. No. 68-96 (1924))); see also
Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigmfor Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the
Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 443, 462-63 (1998) (stating that while courts normally give
substantial deference to an arbitrator's decision, "this deference 'does not grant
carte blanche approval to any decision that the arbitrator might make' " and,
therefore, courts "retain a very limited power to review commercial arbitration
awards outside of section 10(a)" (alteration in original) (quoting Advest, Inc. v.
McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1990))).
127 See supra note 3 and accompanying text; Curtin, supra note 76, at 350.
128 O'Mullan, supra note 30, at 1135-36.
129 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
130 See Montes v. Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1460 (11th
Cir. 1997) (observing that every circuit except the Fifth Circuit has recognized that
"manifest disregard of the law" constitutes sufficient grounds to vacate an
arbitrator's decision); see also Paul Turner, Preemption: The United States
ArbitrationAct, The Manifest Disregardof the Law Test for Vacating an Arbitration
Award, and State Courts, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 519, 528 (1999).
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explicitly disregarded it.'3' Under a broader application, an
award will be upheld even where an arbitrator has "acted
contrary to the applicable law," unless "the award [would] result
13 2
in significant injustice."
The Second Circuit has recognized the manifest disregard of
the law test but has also acknowledged that the doctrine is
severely limited. 3 3 In Halligan v. Piper Jaffray,3 4 the court
cautioned that manifest disregard " 'clearly means more than
error or misunderstanding with respect to the law.' "135 The
court further noted that in order "to modify or vacate an award
on this ground, a court must find both that the (1) arbitrators
knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or
ignored it altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrators
was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case."3 6
Most state and federal courts have established a number of
other non-statutory grounds justifying vacatur of an arbitral
award. 3 7 Grounds for vacatur that are outside the express
statutory scope of section 10 of the FAA include violation of
capriciousness, 3 9
or
arbitrariness
policy, 3 8
public
irrationality,'140 or failure to draw the essence of the award from
the underlying contract.' 4 ' The courts often find them difficult to

131See Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 939 (10th Cir. 2001)
(interpreting manifest disregard of the law to mean " 'willful inattentiveness to the
governing law' " (quoting ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455, 1463
(10th Cir. 1995))); see also Sasser, supra note 10, at 342-43.
132 Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 197 F.3d 752, 762 (5th Cir. 1999).
133 See Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 1998).
134 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998).
135 Id. at 202 (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker,
808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986)).
136 Id.
137 See Williams, 197 F.3d at 757-58.
138See WARE, supra note 35, § 2.45, at 95-96.
139 See Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 1410,
1413 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting that an award will be found to be arbitrary and
capricious only when" 'the arbitrator's decision can[not] be inferred from the facts of
the case' ") (alternation in original) (citations omitted).
140 See Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir.
1972) ("lAin award may not stand if it does not meet the test of fundamental
rationality.").
141 See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987)
("As long as the arbitrator's award 'draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement,' and is not merely 'his own brand of industrial justice,' the award is
legitimate." (quoting United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 597 (1960))).
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apply, however, because these non-statutory standards for
142
vacatur can be vague and confusing.
In addition to the court-created "non-statutory" grounds of
review, the review of arbitral awards made under federal
statutory claims has been expanded as a matter of judicial
policy, again, with no perception of violation of constitutional
restraints. The Supreme Court has firmly established that
statutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement
enforceable under the FAA. 43
Pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate a claim have been held to be enforceable under various
federal statues including the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 144 the Sherman Act, 145 the civil provisions of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 146 the
Securities Act of 1933,1 47 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,148
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.149
In response to those who argue that arbitrators may not
know the intricacies of a statute, the Supreme Court has stated
that "although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily
is limited, such review is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators
comply with the requirements of the statute" in question. 15 0
Although the Court has not elaborated on what such review
encompasses, it suggests an "error of law" standard of precisely
the standard of review rejected by the Tenth Circuit in Bowen
and the Seventh Circuit in Chicago Typographical Union No. 16
v. Chicago Sun-Times.15 1 While a court will normally give
142 See generally WARE, supra note 35, § 2.45, at 94; see also Hochman, supra
note 28, at 110; Sasser, supra note 10, at 342 n.34.
143See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). See
generally WARE, supra note 35, § 2.27, at 63 (describing how prior to the 1980s, the
FAA was largely confined to contract disputes). During the 1980s, "the Supreme
Court revolutionized arbitration law to require enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate regardless of the claims asserted," including statutory claims. Id. § 2.27, at

63.
144 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
145See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 614,
635-37 (1985).
146See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
147 See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 48586 (1989).
148 See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 513-20 (1974).

149 See Litaker v. Lehman Bros. Holdings, No. 97 Civ. 1607 (DC), 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12581, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 1999).
150 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32 n.4 (quoting ShearsonlAm. Express, Inc. v. McMahon,

482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987)).
151 935 F.2d 1501 (1991).
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deference to an arbitrator's decision, "there is no reason why
[arbitrators'] interpretations of the proper application of statutes
should be given greater weight than that of the district
courts." 152 On the contrary, it is argued that arbitrators should
be subject to more stringent review when resolving statutory
claims because judges have greater expertise in interpreting
53
statutory law than arbitrators.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of judicial review of
arbitration of statutory claims in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 54 This case involved business
partners and federal antitrust laws. 155 Soler had agreed to sell
Mitsubishi-manufactured vehicles in an area of Puerto Rico. 15 6
The sales agreement provided that all disputes would be settled
by arbitration. 57 When Soler was unable to meet its expected
sales volume, it refused to accept shipments of vehicles it had
ordered, and Mitsubishi filed suit in United States District Court
in Puerto Rico, claiming breach of contract. 5 8
Soler
counterclaimed, alleging violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act. 15 9 The district court ordered Soler and Mitsubishi to
arbitrate in compliance with the provision in the sales
agreement. 16 0
The court of appeals found that Soler's
counterclaims under the Sherman Act were not subject to
arbitration and reversed that portion of the district court's
order. 161
The Supreme Court reversed, finding Soler's antitrust
claims arbitrable. 16 2 Specifically, the Court stated that by
agreeing to arbitrate claims under federal laws, "a party does not
152 David E. Feller, Arbitration and the External Law Revisited, 37 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 973, 980 (1993).
153 See Julian J. Moore, Arbitral Review (Or Lack Thereol): Examining the
Procedural Fairness of Arbitrating Statutory Claims, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1572,
1583 (2000) (suggesting that the deference normally given to arbitrators should not
extend to statutory claims).
154 473 U.S. 614 (1985).

155Id. at 616-17.
156Id. at 617.
157 Id.
158 Id.

at 618.

159Id. at 619-20.
160 Id. at 620-21.
161 Id. at 623.
162 See id. at 628-29. The Court also noted that "[n]othing... prevents a party
from excluding statutory claims from the scope of an agreement to arbitrate." Id. at
628.
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forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only
submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial,
forum. It trades the procedures and opportunity for review of
the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of
arbitration."163 The Court added, "[S]o long as the prospective
litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of
action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve
both its remedial and deterrent function." 16 4 Furthermore, if an
arbitrator fails to take recognition of a statutory cause of action,
the Court will consider the arbitration agreement to be against
public policy. 165 This decision suggests that, where a statutory
claim is raised, "federal district courts and courts of appeals are
charged with the obligation to exercise sufficient judicial
scrutiny to ensure that arbitrators comply with their duties and
the requirements of the statutes." 166 Such oversight would
require courts to conduct an expanded review of the award not
typically permitted under the FAA, in order to determine if in
fact the arbitral award is contrary to the intent and
requirements of the statute. Thus, the freedom of contract in
arbitration and the protection of parties with statutory claims
supports expanded judicial review of arbitral awards.
An
expanded review for compliance with the law is a minimal
16 7
procedural safeguard in the arbitration of statutory clams.
CONCLUSION
The primary purpose of the FAA is to place contracts to
arbitrate on equal footing with other contracts. 168 Accordingly, if
parties decide to expand the scope of review and sacrifice some of
the perceived benefits of arbitration, the agreement should be
enforced according to its terms. Yet the circuit courts remain
163

Id.

164 Id. at 637.

See id. at 637 n. 19.
Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 197 F.3d 752, 761 (5th Cir. 1999). In
other words, courts must examine arbitral awards in order to make certain that
arbitrators have protected the rights of parties subject to compulsory arbitration of
a federal statutory right and the parties have not forgone their "substantive
statutory rights or effective vindication of their statutory causes of action." Id. at
760-61.
167 See Moore, supra note 155, at 1588-89 (calling for minimal safeguards for
arbitration of statutory claims, including the qualifications of the arbitrator to hear
statutory claims and scrutiny of the arbitration hearings).
16s See supra notes 14 and 15 and accompanying text.
165
166
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split on whether freedom of contract allows parties to expand the
scope of judicial review of arbitration awards. The available case
law suggests that if parties make no modifications with respect
to review within their arbitration agreements, then the
arbitration award will be reviewed under the standards set forth
under section 10 of the FAA. Arbitration is based, however,
upon freedom of contract, and as such, parties should be able to
structure arbitration agreements according to their wishes.
Furthermore, parties can expand the scope of review without
raising any jurisdictional or constitutional issues by limiting an
arbitrator's discretion in the arbitration clause.
As has been seen, the courts have already granted expanded
review of arbitration awards made under statutory claims
because of the nature and importance of the claims. Although
permitting parties to modify the scope of judicial review may
impose issues of efficiency and finality upon the courts, 169 parties
will be more likely to submit to arbitration if they feel that they
have some control over the outcome of the process. In order to
promote arbitration as an alternative to litigation, as opposed to
"ta preliminary step before litigation," 170 the importance of
freedom of contract and individual rights must be recognized.
The practice of allowing parties to contractually modify the scope
of review of arbitration awards effectively promotes the
legislative intent of the FAA and, equally as important, is not
unconstitutional.

169 See generally Sasser, supra note 10, at 363-66 (discussing the public policy

and impracticalities of permitting parties to expand the scope of judicial review).
But see In re Fils et Cables D'Acier de Lens v. Midland Metals Corp., 584 F. Supp.
240, 244 (S.D.N.Y 1984) (recognizing that while review of an arbitration award
under expanded review would increase the burden on the court, that burden is still
significantly less than what it would be had the parties forgone arbitration
completely and demanded a full trial).
170See WARE, supra note 35, § 2.43, at 89-90.

